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Abstract
Recently the Supreme Court, in the case of Foley v. Connelie, l upheld a New York statute
which limited the appointment of members of the state police force to citizens of the United States.
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Recently the Supreme Court, in the case of Foley v. Connelie,l up-
held a New York statute which limited the appointment of members
of the state police force to citizens of the United States.2 Foley, an Irish
resident alien, brought a class action seeking a declaration that the New
York statute in question 3 violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. After Foley was certified as representative of a
class of those similarly situated, a three-judge district .court granted a
summary judgment to the defendants,' from which the plaintiff appealed
to the Supreme Court of the United States. A divided Court upheld the
statute and refused to grant relief.5
Historically, aliens have often suffered discrimination of various
economic and social kinds. Starting long ago, states enacted legislation
discriminating against aliens in a wide range of activities' and, prior to
World War II, the Supreme Court displayed a great deal of tolerance
toward those state laws.7 During this period of non-interference by the
Court, the sole decision striking down a discriminatory state law against
aliens was Truax v. Raich.8 In Truax, the Court invalidated a state law
1. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
2. N.Y. Exec. Law §215(3) (McKinney Supp. 1976), which reads in part: "No
person shall be appointed to the New York state police force unless he shall be a citizen
of the United States ..
3. Id.
4. Foley v. Connelie, 419 F. Supp. 889 (S.D. N.Y. 1976).
5. 435 U.S. 291.
6. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) (aliens forbidden to own land for
the purpose of farming); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915) (public works contracts);
Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927) (operating pool halls); Trageser
v. Gray, 73 Md. 250, 20 A. 905 (1890) (selling liquor); Commonwealth v. Hana, 195
Mass. 262, 81 N.E. 149 (1907) (peddling goods); Wright v. May, 127 Minn. 150, 149
N.W. 9 (1914) (acting as auctioneers).
A more detailed description of earlier discrimination against aliens especially in the
employment area is provided in Rosales, Resident Aliens and the Right to Work: The
Quest for Equal Protection, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1029 (1975).
7. Id.
8. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
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requiring employers of five or more persons to hire at least 80% of their
employees from among qualified electors or native-born United States
citizens. However, the Supreme Court asserted in dicta that the "special
public interest" in state regulation of a wide variety of governmental
concerns could justify less favorable state treatment of non-citizens?
This proposition became known as the "special public interest" doc-
trine' O and later became the basis upon which the Court upheld a broad
range of discriminatory practices against aliens. The decision in Truax
is best understood as an expression of the Court's devotion to the em-
ployers' liberty of contract and property during the Lochner era.' How-
ever, Truax did not prove to have a substantial impact on the continued
trend of discrimination against aliens in the area of employment. Truax
stood alone among many contrary decisions.12
The Court's indulgence in discrimination against aliens quickly
dissipated after World War II.13 Later cases greatly reduced the scope
of the "special public interest" doctrine" as a result of a broadened
interpretation of Congress' plenary authority over immigration" and a
judicial recognition that alienage itself constituted a suspect classifica-
tion. 6 The former practice of upholding discriminatory statutes was
rapidly replaced by a new trend of decisions striking down such legisla-
tion. 7 By the 1970's, the Supreme Court was insisting that states were
generally powerless to treat aliens as a distinct class for reasons of
federal supremacy s and, further, that such treatment also amounted to
9. Id. at 39.
10. Graham v. Richardson, 439 U.S. 365 (1971).
11. In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), a statute which prohibited
employers from requiring employees of bakeries to work more than sixty hours a week
was held unconstitutional at the behest of a bakery owner, on the grounds that it
interfered with the liberty of contract of his employees. See also Hires v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52 (1940).
12. See note 6 supra.
13. In two decisions in 1948, the Supreme Court began to reformulate its position
on the equal protection doctrine as it applied to discrimination against aliens. See
Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (striking down a provision of the California
Alien Land Law); Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948)
(invalidating a California state law denying fishing licenses to aliens ineligible for United
States citizenship).
14. 439 U.S. 365.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. See also note 13 supra; In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman
v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
18. 403 U.S. at 378: "State laws that restrict the eligibility of aliens for welfare
2
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an invidious discrimination. 9 Thus, in Graham v. Richardson,"° the
Court declared invalid state statutes denying welfare benefits to resi-
dent aliens and, in Sugarman v. Dougall,21 the Court invalidated a
statutory prohibition against employment of aliens in the state compe-
titive civil service.22 Similarly, the Court has ruled that resident aliens
may not be excluded from practicing law2 or from practice as licensed
civil engineers." The Court became highly critical of blanket prohibi-
tions against the employment of aliens and other legislation which was
neither "narrowly confined" nor "precisely drawn" and "swept in-
discriminately" against aliens in the area of employment. 2
Today, aliens in the United States are still deprived of the right to
vote" and, consequently, are lacking "the most basic means of defend-
ing themselves in the political processes." z This is one of the major
reasons why alienage has been elevated to "suspect classification." The
usual objection to judicial intervention (i.e., that the popularly-elected
legislature is the more democratic arena for deciding public issues) is
absent, and the courts have deemed it necessary to offer their special
protection to those who are not adequately represented in the legisla-
ture. This political powerlessness, when combined with the historical
discrimination which aliens have suffered, makes it readily arguable that
alienage should be treated as a suspect classification. However, the
benefits merely because of their alienage conflict with overriding national policies in an
area constitutionally entrusted to the Federal Government."
19. For a definition of invidious discrimination, see Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
68 (1968).
20. 403 U.S. 365.
21. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
22. Id. While the statute rested on a legitimate state interest in having loyal
employees'and in establishing the states' own form of government, the statute was
neither narrowly confined nor precise in its application, and therefore failed.
23. In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729 (1973), rejecting as insufficiently substan-
tial the state interest in maintaining high professional standards, and disagreeing with
the argument that "status of holding a license to practice law places one so close to the
core of the political process as to make [one] a formulator of government policy."
24. Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
25. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 643; accord, Examining Bd. v. Flores de
Otero, 426 U.S. at 605-606.
26. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 163 (1874).
27. Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 580, 456 P. 2d 645, 654 (1969)
(en banc).
28. To determine what criteria the Supreme Court employs in deciding whether
a class is to be deemed suspect, see Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
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concept of suspect classifications is a modern phenomenon; thus, it is
not surprising that the decisions which seem to place alienage in this
category date from the 1970's.
It has been well settled by the Burger Court that states carry a
tremendous burden of justification when attempting to legitimize dis-
crimination against aliens in the employment arena.29 This is a result of
the recent extension of the equal protection doctrine to the Supreme
Court's finding that alienage is a suspect classification. However, sus-
pect classifications are not forbidden classifications. Instead, the courts
merely indicate that such classifications will be subject to close judicial
scrutiny. Whether all suspect classifications will receive the same level
of close judicial scrutiny has been the subject of great controversy in
recent years. The term "strict scrutiny" has come to mean that certain
kinds of government-imposed inequalities must be justified as necessary
for the achievement of a compelling state interest. 0 Because alienage
is a suspect classification with respect to the states,3' statutes which
preclude aliens from certain types of employment are subject to strict
scrutiny32 and a state must show some overriding "special public inter-
est" 3 in order to justify such a classification. Further, a state must
select a means to pursue that purpose which does not unnecessarily
burden constitutionally protected conduct.34 However, this standard, at
best, has been difficult to comprehend. This is due in part to the notion
of a rigid "compelling state interest" standard of review in suspect
classification cases. In reality, the level of judicial scrutiny applied by
the Supreme Court varies along a continuum depending upon the inter-
est at stake. The more the Court feels the interest at stake to be funda-
mental or the more the legislative classification approaches being sus-
pect, the higher the degree of judicial scrutiny the Court will apply.
"Several recent decisions addressing the issue of aliens' right to
work indicate that suspect class statutes of alienage is slowly eroding.
As a result, it is possible that state action against aliens will no longer
29. See note 17 supra.
30. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
31. See In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634
(1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
32. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944).
33. 379 U.S. 184 (overriding statutory purpose is required to uphold a statute
having a racial classification).
34. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
1252 3:1979 1
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be strictly scrutinized."3 5 This gradual erosion has been caused by the
reluctance of the Supreme Court to equate the rights of aliens with those
of United States citizens in areas that are possibly considered
"politically tinged." The idea of the "political community" has been the
basis for the Court's distinction between citizen and alien rights both in
and out of the employment area.36 Citizens, as members of the
"political community,"3 possess many political privileges to which
aliens have no constitutional right. The courts have recognized that
some state interests might justify a disqualification of non-citizens from
employment 3 and, therefore, have never held that aliens have a
"constitutional, right to vote or hold high public office." 3 The rights
to vote,40 hold high public office,4 and serve on juries," are seen as
political rights that go to "the heart of our system of government."43
This is so because these rights entail the formulation of public policy
and community standards in addition to participation in the operation
of governmental affairs. Using this conception of a "political com-
munity,"" the courts have upheld restrictions on the rights of aliens by
reasoning that a state has a compelling interest in sheltering its concept
of a "political community."45 The courts evidently feel that a state's
"political community" would slowly dissipate if it were not restricted
to those who are familiar with this country's political and social stand-
ards. 6 Whether this theory has any basis in either fact or reason is
questionable.
35. D. Chin, Aliens' Right to Work: State and Federal Discrimination, 45
FORDHAm L. REV. 835, 838 (1976) (hereinafter referred to as Chin).
36. 413 U.S. at 648-49; 405 U.S. at 334; United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518
F. 2d 972 (5th Cir. 1975).
37. Id. See also Surmeli v. New York, 412 F. Supp. 394 (S.D. N.Y. 1976).
38. 413 U.S. 634. The Court's reservations expressed in Sugarman show that the
implications are that the principle of alienage as a suspect classification is far from being
fully developed. Accordingly, the Court left the door open for a remission in the princi-
ple that alienage will continue to be a suspect classification.
39. Id. at 717.
40. Id. at 648.
41. Id. at 658.
42. 518 F. 2d at 975.
43. Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134, 137 (D. Md. 1974) (three-judge court),
affd. mem., 426 U.S. 913 (1976).
44. 405 U.S. at 344; 413 U.S. at 648-49; see Surmeli v. New York, 412 F. Supp.
394, 397 (S.D. N.Y. 1976).
45. 405 U.S. at 344.
46. Foley v. Connelie, 419 F. Supp. 889, 895 (S.D. N.Y. 1976), 435 U.S. 291.
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5
et al.: Equal Protection for Aliens: The Sliding Scale of Judicial Review
Published by NSUWorks, 1979
1 254
The political distinction between aliens and citizens has resulted in
a series of cases which, if not conflicting, are at the very best confusing.
It is clear that the nature of some professions requires that citizenship
be considered before hiring.17 However, the degree of consideration
which will be permitted and the occupations for which it will be allowed
is where the confusion lies. The perplexity is a result of certain profes-
sions "skirting the border between purely political functions such as
holding public office and purely apolitical positions such as driving taxi
cabs.""8 Thus, lawyers,"9 civil servants," teachers51 and state troopers,52
for example, engage in occupations that lie on the uncertain line; they
are awaiting the stamp of judicial approval permitting citizenship to be
included in the many criteria required for the particular position. In
1973, the Supreme Court rendered two key decisions on the same day,
each dealing with the political distinctions between citizens and aliens.53
Both decisions dealt with state restrictions on the rights of aliens to
employment. Sugarman v. DougaiP' addressed the validity of a New
York civil service law-" which made citizenship a requisite to holding
any permanent position in the competitive class of the state civil service.
In striking down the New York law as violative of the equal protection
clause, the Court stated:
We recognize a State's interest in establishing its own form of govern-
ment, and in limiting participation in the government to those who are
within "the basic conception of a political community." But in seeking
to achieve this substantial purpose, with discrimination against aliens, the
means the state employs must be precisely drawn in light of the acknowl-
edged purpose."
47. See text accompanying notes 41 and 46 supra.
48. Chin, supra note 35.
49. 413 U.S. 717.
50. 413 U.S. 634.
51. Norwick v. Nyquist, 417 F. Supp. 913 (S.D. N.Y. 1976) (three-judge court),
appeal filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1977) (No. 76-808).
52. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291.
53. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717
(1973).
54. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
55. N.Y. Civil Service Law §53(1)(1976), reads in part: "Except as herein other-
wise provided, no person shall be eligible for appointment for any position in the
competitive class unless he is a citizen of the United States."
56. 413 U.S. at 642.
254
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Evidently the Court has recognized that some employees "who partici-
pate in the formulation and execution of government policy"5 are per-
missibly vulnerable to discrimination based on alienage because it is
within a state's power to define and limit its "political community. '"' a
However, any such limitation must be "precisely drawn" and not overly
broad. The Court specifically noted in dicta that a limitation on the
employment of aliens, when narrowly confined, would be valid where
alienage was relevant in maintaining a state's conceptual "political com-
munity."59
In Sugarman, the Court left the door open to discrimination
against aliens by recognizing that some state interests might justify a
disqualification of non-citizens from employment." However, that door
was closed to but a crack on the same day when the Court decided In
Re Griffiths.1 Griffiths made it quite clear that the proposition set forth
in Sugarman would be strictly construed by invalidating a Connecticut
court rule which limited the practice of law to citizens.62 The Court
noted: "Lawyers have been leaders in government throughout the his-
tory of our country. Yet, they are not officials of government by virtue
of being lawyers. Nor does the status of holding a license to practice
law place one so close to the core of the political process as to make
him a formulator of government policy." Thus, aliens are protected
from discrimination in the legal field because lawyers are not suffi-
ciently connected with the "political community" so as to justify a
state's interest in excluding aliens from this type of employment. What
the Court seems to be seeking in order to sustain discriminatory statutes
against aliens in the employment area is a kind of loyalty to the United
States as an important requisite to faithful performance of the occupa-
tion in question. Holding high public office is an example of such an
occupation." However, it is doubtful that this standard can be applied
extensively beyond the holding of high office since the Court has re-
jected the so-called "membership in the political community" argument
57. Id.
58. 405 U.S. at 344.
59. 413 U.S. at 649.
60. Id. at 647.
61. 413 U.S. at 717.
62. Id.
63. Id. It is unclear whether the Court is referring to state attorneys and United
States attorneys as distinguished from those who practice privately.
64. 413 U.S. at 648.
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in both the civil service employment 5 and bar admission6 contexts.
Perhaps other forms of state employment are sensitive to a possible
conflict of national loyalties. The Court, in Foley v. Connelie, 7 raised
the political distinctions between aliens and citizens which, for the first
time, became the basis of the Court's decision to uphold an anti-alien
statute in the employment area.
The first issue which the majority confronted in Foley was whether
citizenship may be a relevant qualification for fulfilling important non-
elective executive, legislative and judicial positions held by officers who
participated lirectly in the formulation, execution or review of broad
public policy. Relying on language used in Sugarman, the Court upheld
this narrow exclusion6 and recognized "a State's historical power to
exclude aliens from participation in its democratic political institu-
tions,"69 as part of the sovereign's obligation "to preserve the basic
conception of a political community. '70 The Court next focused upon
the question of whether the occupation of state trooper fit into this
narrow exclusion. In holding that it does, the Court noted:
The police function fulfills a most fundamental obligation of government
to its constituency. Police officers in the ranks do not formulate policy,
per se, but they are clothed with authority to exercise an almost infinite
variety of discretionary powers. The execution of broad powers vested in
them affects members of the public significantly and often in the most
sensitive areas of daily life.7
The Court reasoned that "a policeman vested with the plenary discre-
tionary powers we have described is not to be equated with a private
person engaged in routine public employment or other 'common occu-
pations of the community' who exercises no broad power over people
generally. 7 3 Therefore, police officers fall within the category of
65. Id. at 634.
66. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
67. 435 U.S. 291 (Upholding N.Y. Exec. Law §215(3) (McKinney Supp. 1976)).
See note 2 supra.
68. 435 U.S. at 300. See In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). This decision
qualified the exception stated in Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), and shows
that this exception was to be construed within narrow limits.
69. 435 U.S. at 295.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 297.
72. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. at 41.
73. 435 U.S. at 298-99.
1 256 3:979 1
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"important non-elective. . .officers who participate directly in the...
execution. . . of broad public policy."7 The Court concluded that "in
the enforcement and execution of the laws the police function is one
where citizenship bears a rational relationship to the special demands
of the particular position."7
The final question addressed by the Court was the degree of scru-
tiny to be applied in assessing the validity of the statute in question."
The majority first acknowledged that recent cases generally reflect a
"close scrutiny of restraints imposed by States on aliens."7 Neverthe-
less, the majority states in dicta that it has never suggested that "such
legislation is inherently invalid, nor that all limitations on aliens are
suspect. 78 The rationale is that it would be inappropriate "to require
every statutory exclusion of aliens to clear the high hurdle of 'strict
structiny', because to do so would 'obliterate all the distinctions between
citizens and aliens, and thus depreciate the historic values of citizen-
ship."'7' Consequently, the Court stated: "Our scrutiny will not be so
demanding where we deal with matters firmly within a State's constitu-
tional prerogatives." 0 The Court then went on to say: "The State need
only justify its classification by a showing of some rational relationship
between the interest sought to be protected and the limiting classifica-
tion.""' According to the Court, this lessened degree of scrutiny is no
more than a "recognition of the fact that a democratic society is ruled
by its people." 82
Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, found it difficult to
reconcile the Court's judgment in this case with the full sweep of the
reasoning and authority of past decisions. "It is only because I have
become increasingly doubtful about the validity of these decisions (in at
least some of which I concurred) that I join the opinion of the Court in
the case." Justice Blackmun had no problem in agreeing with the
result reached in Foley. Citing Sugarman v. Dougall, he wrote, when a
state is acting in accordance with dictates as set out in that case, "it need
74. Id. at 300; see also Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 647.
75. Id. at 300.
76. See note 2 supra.
77. 435 U.S. at 294.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 296, citing 413 U.S. 647, 648.
81. Id.
82. 435 U.S. at 296.
83. Id. at 300.
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justify its discriminatory classifications only by showing some rational
relationship between its interest in preserving the political community
and the classification it employs." 4
Justice Marshall, with whom Justices Brennan and Stevens joined
dissenting, disagreed with the majority opinion that state troopers per-
form functions placing them within the narrow exception as set out in
Sugarman," preferring instead to follow the usual rule that discrimina-
tion against aliens is presumptively unconstitutional:
In one sense, of course, it is true that state troopers participate in the
execution of public policy. Just as firefighters execute public policy that
fires should be extinguished, state troopers execute the public policy that
persons believed to have committed crimes should be arrested. But this
fact simply demonstrates that the Sugarman exception, if read without
regard to its context, "would swallow the rule."'
Justice Marshall evidently felt that Sugarman unambiguously holds that
a blanket exclusion of aliens from state jobs is unconstitutional. He
further expressed, in what appears to be the most cogent argument of
the entire case, his view that the phrase "execution of broad public
policy,""7 as enunciated in Sugarman, cannot be read to mean "simply
the carrying out of government programs, but rather must be inter-
preted to include responsibility for actually setting government policy
pursuant to a delegation of substantial authority from the legislature." 8
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Brennan joined, dissenting,
found a rule which disqualifies an entire class of persons from profes-
sional employment "doubly objectionable." 9 He was particularly con-
cerned with identifying the "group characteristic that justifies the unfa-
vorable treatment of an otherwise qualified individual simply because
he is an alien."9 Justice Stevens felt the disqualifying charcteristic to
be a foreign allegiance' which raised a doubt concerning loyalty and
trustworthiness so pervasive that a flat ban against the employment of
84. Id. at 302.
85. Id. at 303.
86. Id. at 303-304.
87. Id. at 304.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 307.
90. Id. at 308.
91. See In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 726 (persons, other than citizens, can in good
conscience, take an oath to support the constitution); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wang, 426
U.S. 88, 111 (1976).
10
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any alien in "any law enforcement position"9 2 would be justified. "But
if the integrity of all aliens is suspect, why may not a State deny aliens
the right to practice law?"' 3 The dissenters here felt that, unless the
Court repudiates its holding in In Re Griffiths,4 it had to reject any
"conclusive presumption that aliens, as a class, are disloyal or untrust-
worthy."' 5 The dissenting members of the Court charged that, should
the majority reject its analysis, it should not uphold "a statutory dis-
crimination against aliens, as a class, without expressly identifying the
group characteristic that justifies the discrimination."" The dissenters
reasoned that, "[i]f there is no group characteristic that explains the
discrimination, one can only conclude that it is without any justification
that has not already been rejected by the Court."' 7
As a result of the majority's holding in Foley v. Connelie," the
standard enunciated in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,"
for reviewing legislation which is to "the peculiar disadvantage of a
suspect class,"'1 is severely weakened, as is Graham, °1 which held state
classifications based on alienage, nationality or race, inherently suspect
and subject to close judicial scrutiny. The Supreme Court has refused
to treat New York's classification as suspect and apply the degree of
scrutiny which past decisions seem to have mandated. These past deci-
sions of the Court have expressly held that any statute distinguishing
aliens from citizens be "precisely drawn and narrowly confined. 11 2 It
is apparent that the statute in question"' is neither "precisely drawn"
nor "narrowly confined." 1 1 To the contrary, it is overly broad and
thereby imposes an unnecessary burden on the basic right to have access
to employment. It will be difficult, indeed, for the Court to reconcile
the decision in Foley with past holdings which have been highly critical
92. 435 U.S. at 308.
93. Id.
94. 413 U.S. 717 (1973); see also text accompanying note 62 supra.
95. 435 U.S. at 308.
96. Id. at 311-12.
97. Id. at 312. "The Court has squarely held that a state may not treat employ-
ment as a scarce resource to be reserved for its own citizens."
98. 435 U.S. 291.
99. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
100. Id.
101. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
102. 413 U.S. at 644.
103. N.Y. Exec. Law §215(3) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
104. 413 U.S. at 644.
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of blanket prohibitions against employment of aliens and of statutes
which "sweep indiscriminately against aliens by restricting jobs to citi-
zens only." ' To attempt to predict the future course of the Supreme
Court on this subject would be to engage in pure speculation. Past
inconsistencies clearly demonstrate that only the Court itself is equipped
to explain the parameters of the Foley decision.
Douglas A. Blankman
105. Id.; qccord, Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 527 (1976).
12
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